

# THE LINGUISTIC INTERPRETATION IN THE DISCORDANT AUTHORSHIP OF EVIL

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## Abstract

This paper proposes to investigate the linguistic interpretation of the authorship of evil as it is applied to the substantiation of evil in the world. The irreconcilable problem of evil continues to spawn countless white pages written by philosophers, sociologists, and theologians contemplating theodicies that endeavor to explain the existence of evil in a world created by an omnipotent, benevolent, and merciful God. Yet, no acceptable solution to the problem has been reached. Humanity continues to wrestle, sometimes loudly, but most often quietly, within the painful shadows of their hearts on this dilemma. It is on this stage in the expanse of the universe that the divine drama began. It is in this cosmos that a radical discordance was penned into existence, thundered upon the stage, and punctured the heart of humankind. What meaning shall humanity interpret from the creation of such permissible havoc? Upon whom shall the of authorship of evil be charged? The proposition herein is to assert an interpretation of culpability on the authorship of evil.

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**Keywords:** Interpretation, Authorship, Linguistics, Evil, Morality, God

## Introduction

The unanswered question to the problem of evil has plagued humanity throughout history. This dilemma is so entrenched in the consciousness of the world that it has possibly been the most pervasive reason people are dissuaded from a faith. Religion demands that its God be of the most perfect character that can be imagined, otherwise value in the religion is not achieved. Therefore, philosophy struggles to reconcile the universal question of how a presumed morally good God could allow evil to thrive.

It is along this line that the *question* itself must be questioned. Are we to merely assume the creator of the universe to be the author of evil? On what linguistic footing are we to discern this interpretation?

Hereto, the point of attack shall be narrowly directed toward the understanding of the authorship of evil. The temptation to resolve the insoluble solution of the problem of evil shall be resisted. As noted by Blanshard (1975), how may the sum and distribution of evil be reconciled within the authority of a good and just God? A forthright question deserves a straight answer and that answer is possibly that the two sides are incapable of reconciliation. It is incumbent upon the philosopher to explore across the landscape of theodicies. Unfortunately, as the decades have revealed, philosophizing tends to stay within the confines of one nucleus of thought and conflict. It might be said that theologians and philosophers often stay too long at the fair.

The crux to evaluating the *authorship* of evil is not to assume at first analysis that God is responsible, nor is it whether the existence of God and evil are incompatible; but rather, to surmise from what vessel has evil entered the world and thereby determine the meaning whereby the author is revealed.

## Evil

The definition of evil here is not to be considered exhaustive, for to do so would create volumes. This is merely a *working* description specifically for this study. Yet, by this very attempt toward a characterization of a definition we are entering the critical challenge to ascribe a linguistic meaning on an interpretation. Therefore, awareness should be noted that explanations of a particular term are often in flux within a given culture and at times swiftly adjusted by new approaches in philosophical and theological endeavors. In short, this is today's definition.

Karl Barth (1956-75) claims that evil has its origins in nothingness (das Nichtige). Nothingness is the "stubborn element," an "alien factor," in the "world-occurrence" that stands in "opposition and resistance to God's world-dominion" (p. 292). In the nothingness system of evil, there is no blame on the created creature. The creature is "exonerated from all responsibility for its existence, presence and activity" (p. 292). In this realm of nothingness, God is ineffectually reacting to nothingness that man in his baseness has generated. Therefore, nothingness is not willed by God, and as such, is evil.

Theo L. Hettema (2007) presents a dramatic evaluation on evil by suggesting, "evil is most often interpreted as a value that is attached to situations, acts or utterances" (p. 120) whereby judgments are rendered upon ethics by the one making the judgment. It is similar to saying 'beauty is in the eye of the beholder'. Who then is correctly appropriate to be the judge of value under judgment? "To some extent the axiological approach meets the

same problem as the metaphysical approach: it considers evil as a category opposite good. As such, it makes evil derivative" (p. 120).

According to John Macquarrie (1977), evil is never a "positive phenomenon." Evil is a reversal of the creative nature of Being. Evil is the contradiction of the Being's intended plan, it is, similar to Barth, the "lapsing into nothing ... [the] ceasing to be" of the created design. Evil, then is the enemy of all Beings. Since good is "the striving to become," evil cannot exist within the good. The goal of evil is the undoing of good (p. 256).

C. S. Lewis (1996) offers the following on the definition of evil:

You can be good for the mere sake of goodness; you cannot be bad for the mere sake of badness. You can do a kind action when you are not feeling kind and when it gives you no pleasure, simply because kindness is right; but no one ever did a cruel action simply because cruelty is wrong - only because cruelty is pleasant or useful to him. In other words, badness cannot succeed even in being bad in the same way in which goodness is good. Goodness is, so to speak, itself: badness is only spoiled goodness. And there must be something good first before it can be spoiled. (p. 50).

It is important to note that evil has at least two distinctions within the community of theology: Moral evil and natural evil. Moral evil is the expression of humanity through particular actions that lead to pain and suffering of others as well as themselves. Natural evil arises from the expressions of nature (hurricanes, diseases, earthquakes) that when in flux disrupts humanity with similar pain and suffering though not as a result of man. Natural (or physical) evil has nothing to do with human choice; it is merely earthly events in nature. This study will address the moral evil that is the product of human choice and is the direct consequence of man's free will and God's design for humanity and the universe.

### **The Problem**

If God is omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent and he is the creator of all things good, it is argued then that he would be morally bound to prevent and limit the occurrences of evil in the world. It then might be reasoned that if God is all-powerful and all-knowing and he does not prevent the occurrences of evil, he is, or should be, to blame for the suffering of the world brought about by the existence of evil.

G. W. Leibniz (1966) calls this problem God's concurrence of evil. "Concerning the origin of evil in its relation to God, I offer a vindication of his perfections that shall extoll not less his holiness, his justice and his goodness than his greatness, his power and his independence" (*Theodicy*, preface). From Leibniz's point of view, a world created by God that contains moral evil does not necessarily implicate God or contradict his attributes.

Why then should God be blamed when humans or angels choose to fall by taking on a prideful nature that ultimately leads to evil acts of rebellion? Is God morally responsible for man's choices? Leibniz would answer there is sufficient reason to respond to the problem of evil. He simply denies that the occurrence of moral evil can implicate God morally as an effective cause of moral evil (Hernandez, 2013).

A theist, understood here as one who believes in God as creator and ruler over the universe, then struggles to explain why a good God is evil. Alvin Plantinga (1974) suggests, "Here the aim is not to say what God's reason *is*, but at most what God's reason *might possibly be*" (p. 28). God can certainly set the stage, design every detail of performance, dictate the length of existence, and calculate all possible outcomes to be determined as he wishes and to happen when and how he deems. He could have created humans without a will of their own or having provided free will, he could have chosen to remove such will as he desired at any time. Not to drift too far off course yet it is worth the pondering that God could have and may have created various dimensions of existence in several universes where every possible scenario might be played out for his pleasure. However, in an effort to rein in these thoughts and elucidate further on the freedom of will, it would be apropos to bring J. L. Mackie (1971) onto the scene.

The free-will defense from Mackie's point of view is this: if God is both all good and omnipotent he could not possibly allow himself the inconsistency from the problem of evil in nature. His attributes simply will not tolerate it. If God has made men such that in their free choices they sometimes prefer what is good and sometimes what is evil, why could he not have made men such that they always freely choose the good? If there is no logical impossibility in a man's freely choosing the good on one, or on several occasions, there cannot be a logical impossibility in his freely choosing the good on every occasion. God was not, then, faced with a choice between making innocent automata and making beings who, in acting freely, would sometimes go wrong: there was open to him the obviously better possibility of making beings who would act freely but always go right. (pp. 100-101).

God then, following this interpretation, is incapable of controlling mankind if in fact God has given mankind pure free will over which God has no power. Therefore, to continue on Mackie's philosophy, why should God get involved at all in the matters of humanity? Likewise, why should he take part in the influence over the dominion of evil in the universe? Man's absolute freedom in this respect then infers that God cannot control the wills and outcomes of humanity. This proposition from Mackie's argument, leads to a God who is no longer omnipotent. If this is the case, the free will of

mankind is rather insignificant in the scheme of universal design and ultimate authorship of all beings. Thus, another question arises: Is it possible for a creator to create a being in which the creator would have no control over? Mackie has positioned his argument such that scriptural text on the attributes of God would no longer hold relevance in Mackie's study of evil. In fact, "theodicy" would not be an appropriate term for a linguistic argument since God would no longer need defense because he would no longer endure as God.

*The Free Will Defense* offered by Plantinga (1971) maintains that God created beings who are free, but he cannot determine them to do only what is right. God's intervention in their choice of good or evil would diminish their condition of a free will choice. Therefore, since mankind was given this free will to choose good, they must also have been given the opportunity to choose evil. This is representative of moral evil. It is on this platform that theists gather to justify God by announcing, "[evil] occurs by ascribing it to the will of man rather than to the will of God" (p. 105).

Leibniz's (1989) view is that God is not morally implicated when he produces a world that contains moral evil. At creation there was nothing positively bad in creation. (p. 114). Therefore, God must have created the world out of a moral imperative and for no other reason. God is the only one who can account for the infinite intricacy in the design of the universe, the existence of man, and the divine concept of harmony. Kavanaugh (2007) notes, as per Leibniz, the all-embracing conception of the individual as given by God will sufficiently justify all that will happen to that individual, yet can retain the free will of the individual to govern his own fate within this subclass of pre-given possibility. (p. 171).

M. J. Murray (2005) offers, God cannot be limited by anything and his creative act is free and beneficent. Creation is a moral act by God – an action in which God's permissive will is displayed and by which it can be recognized that God has no superior. (pp. 194-216). Along this line, as Leibniz would contend, man's universe contains the best of both worlds. "God's permission of moral evil in the world and God's permission of the best series of events to occur in the world are inextricably linked" (Hernandez, 2013, p. 98). This best, unfortunately, still places the creator as being intimately involved with the creation of a flawed man capable of sin through his freedom of will. Burned by his own demise of existence, man then is placed into a world where there are goods and evils of fortune allocated according to the laws of chance. We are left with no choice but to enter the lottery. (Geach, 1977, p.120).

The problem of the linguistic interpretation of evil is a problem of defense and resolution toward the position of evil in a perfect creation. Yet, evil is retained in the creation of humanity and at some specific point had its

birth. How is this to be resolved and from which one or many offers of theodicy is the answer to be found? “The problem of evil, therefore, is not confined to theology but is a metaphysical problem that is not mitigated by denying God’s existence, and is one that no philosopher can escape” (Harris, 1977, pp. 6-7).

### **The Argument**

The argument of evil, and perhaps its teleology, continues to challenge linguistic interpretation. Is evil merely an adjective subject to rhetoric and dramatics? On what criteria do we discern evil or morality? Do we have the right to question the creator on this point – and for that matter on any point of his will? John Feinberg (1979) suggests that for anyone holding to the proposition that the transcendent and omnipotent attributes of God are the foundation on which the universe was created and exists then their notion of God sets a precedent. Therefore, the idea that anyone holding this concept of God could logically presume a standard of good and evil and then use it to sit in judgment of the actions of God, the creator of all that exists, is both preposterous and blasphemous. (p. 11). Who then is man that he should proclaim God to be good, fair, all knowing, and all loving, and in turn submit a demand for justification and reason of his moral activities?

John Hick (1981) reasons that finite persons were created in a universal environment of moral evil where humans were inevitably victims of their own consequence of being free agents. He continues saying that through the struggles and hardships of life humans can develop the superior ideals of mutual love and care, self-sacrifice for others, and commitment to a common good. (pp. 47-50). Humanity will struggle but through maturity, and here Hick implies an eschatological consequence, humanity’s moral and spiritual sanctification will be justified in the afterlife.

Barth (1956-75) also places God as the creator without fault. He argues that ultimately, no matter the consequence of evil in man, the God of the universe is exclusively and resolutely a jealous God and his divine sovereignty trumps all. Without this possibility of defection or of evil, creation would not be distinct from God and therefore not really His creation. The fact that the creature can fall away from God and perish does not imply any imperfection on the part of creation or the creator. What it does mean positively as Barth notes is that it is something created and is therefore dependent on preserving grace, just as it owes its very existence simply to the grace of its creator. A creature freed from the possibility of falling away would not really be living as a creature. It could only be a second God – and as no second God exists, it could only be God himself. (p. 503).

Then there exists the notion of *neither God, nor man created the existence of evil*. This is not a declaration humanity is willing to accept. One must be accused. There is no other God. And, man cannot create something out of nothing. Thus, the argument continues since he who created all things must have created evil and it had to have been good or if not then scripture is false. If God did not create evil a new set of problems arise as to how evil might have acquired existence into humanity. The human self then is in process of becoming and it is through the existence of evil that man is transformed and available to be redeemed. This self-becoming consists in a rise in self-consciousness and freedom – what Kierkegaard calls *spirit*. (Roberts, 2006, p. x). The rise of man’s self-consciousness and freedom is the crucible wherein man may discover the source of his evil and rebellion against God.

If, then, freedom for man is to do a thing and the will to do a thing and the freedom to refrain from a thing, good or evil, then he may not act along God’s will necessarily. David Hume (1955) says, “By liberty, then, we can only mean a power of acting or not acting according to the determinations of the will; that is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may” (p. 104).

If it is without question that God is sovereign and his will is justified, he should formally be relieved from the argument. But does it? Barth (1956-75) says that God is uniquely predisposed to do good and good is dictated by him as the creator. Therefore, Barth’s statement does not remove culpability from God in the creation debate on the origin of evil.

It is impossible to address the argument surrounding the problem of evil without facing the relationship between divine determinism and free will among created beings. D. A. Carson (2006) offers that God is absolutely sovereign in that he never restricts humanity’s responsibility, and that humans are free individuals, yet God’s character is not contingent on their choices, but their decisions *are* contingent upon God’s sovereignty. (p. 179). The question that arises as Campbell (1957) notes, “Can man make choices and act freely upon those choices with personal moral responsibility under the concept that all things in heaven and on earth are determined?” (p. 160) We must clarify whether the self is morally the sole cause of the good or evil act, or whether there has been an external to the self whereby the act for which the self can be held morally responsible. In other words, has something acted upon the self for whom the self might not be wholly responsible?

In this regard, Ron Nash (1983) maintains that God is ultimately answerable for the evil in the world, as he alone is held morally responsible. (p. 55). The free will of agents populated in the universal design and their

alleged culpability in partnership with the creator will remain key to this investigation.

### **God's Goodness on Trial**

Had evil never been designed into the equation of the universe, there would not be an indictment toward God's goodness, nor would there be a world desperately confused and in contemplation over the problem of evil. Whether good for humanity or not, evil is permitted to exist and thrive and the world has been left penetrated by the poison from the sting of evil. Death, destruction, and suffering from this sting is daily permitted in the presence of a good God, the good creator of the universe, the omnipotent loving One. It is not surprising that humanity, especially in the wake of personal horrific suffering, moves past questioning why evil exists and marches toward the religious dilemma of whether God is actually good. It is at this point that many religious folks, who feel they have been duped and betrayed by the Church, check their faith at the door and drift into the world angry, desperate, and hopeless.

How does one then defend God from the problem of evil? Possibly the question should be, "Who is man to question God?" Being aware that this paper is a linguistic exploration in theodicy and the question of evil's origins, it seems accurate to suggest that theodicies on the problem of evil might find a more reconcilable solution by moving from the landscape of theodicies toward the empty chairs at the table of the prosecution. Man and Lucifer have been banned from the courtroom and thus the hearing proceeds with the only one willing to take the stand, the Creator of all that is.

C. S. Lewis (1996) offered that the goodness of God is anchored in the belief that the scriptures provides all the character development one should ask for in a story. There is no character flaw in God. If one is to believe in the inerrant word of God, then he should know that the statements as to God's character are without flaw. Furthermore, Lewis had no problem accepting that whatever the problem of evil proposes, God's goodness is without discrepancy. God spills out his love on humanity with the needs of man at the forefront of God's desire. The inability of man to reason a truth beyond a showdown of doubt remains in man's limited perspective and his finite knowledge of God and the universe. (p.45). If man felt the need to bring God's goodness to trial then it would be incumbent for man to provide the proof of God's failing.

"In relation to God," Leibniz (1966) wrote, "nothing is open to question, nothing can be opposed to the rule of the best, which suffers neither exception nor dispensation" (p. 42). It is in this way that God permits evil since the grand result of all that he creates and wills is an ultimate perfection of wisdom and goodness. God chooses absolutely the best

possible scenarios in his divine plan for the justification of the universe that he has created. “Therefore, the consequent will of God, which has sin for its object, is only permissive” (p. 42). God only permits sin to exist; he does not will it into existence. By this statement it is evident that Leibniz recognizes the ethical responsibility incumbent upon God for his created beings. Man’s good actions suggest no moral problem with God’s holiness. However, if his created beings produce evil then God is implicated, in as much as a father is of a son. (Feinberg, 1979, p. 41). Yet, like a son’s rebellion from his father, the son rebels by the act of his free will to rebel, not by his father’s desire.

The problem of the problem of evil is the direction at which the prosecutor, aka humanity, points its finger. The blame is concentrated on the being from whom all life exists – from whom humanity would not have a finger to point if not for God’s goodness. However, that does not soften the question of real suffering among humanity. Plantinga (1985) suggests that humanity can on some level sufficiently unravel the academic problem of evil, but “this is cold and abstract comfort when faced with the shocking concreteness of a particularly appalling exemplification of evil” (pp. 35-36).

Augustine faced the problem of evil similarly along the lines of God’s goodness. His position was to explain how a good God might coexist with evil. This was preceded by Augustine’s notion that God could not be all good if he knowingly created evil. Thus, if there is an agreement that God exists and is good, it would not have been in his character to create evil. Here is the where the finger must be redirected.

### **The Vessel**

If all things had a moment of creation, then the creation of evil should be traceable to a specific entry point. Whether or not that creative moment can be determined is not the subject here, rather it is the recognition that indeed there was surely an instant of design that the existence of evil became relevant to the problem for humanity. Regarding the source of evil, Leibniz (1966) explains the relation of metaphysical evil to moral evil.

Evil may be taken metaphysically, physically and morally. Metaphysical evil consists in mere imperfection, physical evil in suffering, and moral evil in sin. Now although physical evil and moral evil be not necessary, it is enough that by virtue of the eternal verities they be possible. For we must consider that there is an original imperfection in the creature before sin, because the creature is limited in its essence; whence ensues that it cannot know all, and that it can deceive itself and commit other errors. (p. 40).

Feinberg (1979) notes here that Leibniz shadows the Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysical traditions and therefore inherent to the Leibniz conception of ‘good’ and ‘evil’, the terms should be reflected to be *pro hen*

(“toward one”). Good is thought by Leibniz to be a transcendental attribute of being, following that his fundamental sense of ‘good’ is a metaphysical one. Additionally, Leibniz adheres to the notion that anything is possible which does not infer a contradiction. (p. 28).

Is sin then to be interpreted as the basic evil that exists and overflows from the vessel that it inhabits? According to Augustine, when inquiring as to the correct order concerning evil, it is best to first ask about its nature and second about its origin. John Hick (1966) suggests that, “Evil does not exist in its own right as one of the original constituents of the universe. On the contrary, the whole creation is good, and evil can consist only in the corrupting of a good substance” (p. 59).

Have we now drifted back to the chicken-and-egg conundrum? Should we think of evil as sin, and therefore sin as an aspect of human nature beyond a defect of creation? Is evil then merely a manifestation of thought that a culture needs to explain and perhaps blame for atrocities, suffering, and pain?

Human beings cannot be separated from the metaphysical world that embraces them and has provided for their creation. All their reasoning has been saturated by the substance and influences through which God’s nature has informed their existence. Chaos cannot logically yield order. (Harris, 1977, p. 11).

### **Authorship**

Is God the author of evil? Simply reasoned it would seem that the answer would be a resounding “No” because for God to do so would be a contradiction of his character. The fallacy within God cannot exist. God cannot be both good and evil. However, as the creator of all things and he assuredly would have created the angles including Lucifer. If then, evil was created in Lucifer who is to blame? How is God’s goodness reconciled in light of the creation of Lucifer? If God is the exemplification of order, chaos cannot exist in his presence. (Fitch, 1967, p. 56).

Thus, the case regarding Lucifer and the fallen angels presents an incomprehensible conception of the self-creation of evil. Here the mystery continues and fundamentally invalidates the result as a sanctuary for theodicy by placing upon God the ultimate accountability for the creation of beings whom he knew would, if created with the freedom of choice, would ultimately bring about evil. (Hick, 1966, p. 66).

To believe that God is good is to believe he is worthy of praise and can be trusted that his ultimate plan is humanities best plan, though the plan cannot be fully comprehended. If the problem of evil threatens this view of God, humanity must have the idea that God has somehow been inadequately prepared in his creation process and thus humanity gives into the suggestion

that one must blame God for the atrocities in the world. This is highly evident when the suffering hits home in the most personal ways imaginable. (G. J. Hughes, 2007, p. 26). Leibniz (1966), in an effort to explain how the existence of evil came to be in the actual world, proposes the following:

Evil springs rather from the Forms themselves in their detached state, that is, from the ideas that God has not produced by an act of his will, any more than he thus produced numbers and figures, and all possible essences which one must regard as eternal and necessary; for they are in the divine understanding. God is therefore not the author of essences in so far as they are only possibilities. But there is nothing actual to which he has not decreed and given existence... (pp. 148-149).

Leibniz (1966) is careful to place importance that God did not create the perceptions of the possibilities or the possible essences, since they are co-eternal with his own existence. Therefore, the actualization of possibilities exists in creation. Feinberg (1979) notes according to Leibniz, God knows all the possibilities there are, but the possibilities are eternal by the nature of things and not themselves created. So, given that God knows all and created all possible realms of conclusions, it is logically possible that God did create the concept of evil. (p. 30).

If creation is an act of God's will? If we treat Lucifer's nature as equally positioned as Adam's, then there is allowance for a right treatment of free will and still maintain God's sovereignty in the sinfulness of both man and angel. As Lewis (1962) put it, "God has created in such a way that the good of his world may be perverted into evil when we misuse it or something goes awry with the creation" (pp. 33-34).

Can it be considered that God be the author of evil in that he created the vessel in which evil has been expressed? A father and mother may train up their son to be a good steward of all his inheritance and they may have taught him to walk upright in love and rightness. However, though the parents authored their son's existence, and may be culpable in the nurtured aspect of the son's personality, they are not responsible for the evil that the son chooses to partake in throughout his life.

He [Satan] opposes the truth of God with falsehoods, he obscures the light with darkness, he entangles men's minds in errors, he stirs up hatred, he kindles contention and combats, everything to the end that he may overturn God's kingdom and plunge man with himself into eternal death. This also is what John Calvin (2008) means in his letter when he writes that the "devil has sinned from the beginning," and indeed he clearly considers him as the architect, author and leader of all malice. (p. 1.14.15).

## Conclusion

Finally, the authorship of evil should not be interpreted as an accusation that God might be culpable by means of foreknowledge, nor asserted in his omnipotence and choice to allow for universal free will. It was ultimately within Lucifer and Man to make the choice to rebel. As a hammer is made for creating, the striking is in the hands of the user. Scriptures confirm that God created all that exists and as for man and the angels, they were created good. In this design, God embedded the *choice* for good or evil.

Hume (1990) offers a metaphor regarding the indictment of God for the cause of evil. Hume suggests the house with problems in every room and all the properties of the house are the source of confusion and darkness. It could be argued that the architect with all his professional skills had built with good intentions, those being omnipotent and omnibenevolence, yet if there were found many inconveniences and deformities in the building, one will without a doubt, condemn the architect. (p.115).

As Feinberg (2001) quotes Plantinga: “If God brings it about that the men He creates always do what is right, then they do not do what is right freely” (p. 1186). It would also seem that doing wrong exists as a possibility in man and within the realm of angelic hosts.

Augustine maintained, as noted by Copan (2013), the case that evil originated, whether in human or angelic form, by moral agents who chose of their own volition to sin (rebel). He also holds that they were created by God without moral defect and yet became sinners. Therefore, it was the creature, not the Creator, who was culpable for the rebellion against God. (p. 118).

Isaiah reveals God’s divine sovereignty and glory over the problem of evil.

I am the LORD, and there is none else, there is no God beside me: I girded thee, though thou hast not known me: That they may know from the rising of the sun, and from the west, that there is none beside me. I am the LORD, and there is none else. I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, and create evil: I the LORD do all these things. (Isaiah 45:5-7, KJV).

The clarity of submission to the one God, who is over the entire universe, does not remove the attempt to answer an unanswerable question, but adjust the angle from how the question is broached. If the theist is to rightly resolve the consequences due to the contemplation of evil, he must think rightly on the attributes of God. He is the living, sovereign Creator, omnipotent, faithful, holy, just, merciful and full of grace toward his creation.

The theist must hold that God is almighty and as such has power over all things. However, Geach (1977) suggests that, while holding belief that God is almighty, one need not believe that God can do everything. The

notion here is that God cannot do everything, for breaking his own word is not logically possible given his nature. The expression 'God can do everything' creates a critical entanglement for humanity. (p. 6).

Any attempts to give reason for the problem of evil will most likely remain unfulfilling. In what remains, humanity must commit, as the thinker, to reason along another line, a new thought. Man can and must trust God to have given humanity the most solutions needed at this time. (Forsyth, 1917, p. 139). God in his authority and greatness is able to establish that evil exist, all the while remaining spotless from any claims of authorship of evil. Humanity must, at some level of certainty, trust in the sovereignty of God and allow for a leap of faith even in the presence of the unanswerable questions. And, the questions that we can answer with some confidence we must hold loosely for tomorrow they maybe found false.

In closing, this paper has endeavored to examine the linguistic interpretation in the debate on the authorship of evil as it is applied to the substantiation of evil in the world. Herein it has been suggested that the indictment of evil rests on the vessels, man and angels, from which evil was first manifested; and thereby finding no culpability for evil in the hand of God. On this resolution, R. A. Mohler (2011) offers:

This, of course, does not solve the problem of evil. The final resolution remains and the complication of theodicies continue. To sum: We dare not speak on God's behalf to explain why He allows acts of evil. At the same time, we dare not be silent when we should testify to the God of righteousness and love and justice who rules over all in omnipotence. There is much we do not understand. As Charles Spurgeon explained, when we cannot trace God's hand, we must simply trust His heart.

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